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"The available English remedies are not adequate substitutes for
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t Mr. Ragozino is an attorney with the Northeast Regional Office of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the Commission) disclaims responsibility for any private publication
or statement by any of its employees. This article expresses the author's views and
does not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other
members of the staff.
1 Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-
5574) [hereinafter Richards Ill.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 3, 1998, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, after reconsideration en banc, joined the
majority of circuit courts in holding that forum selection and
choice of law clauses in Lloyd's of London 2 policies are enforcea-
ble despite anti-waiver provisions contained in the Securities
Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 which
appear to prohibit enforcement of the choice clauses.5 In so
holding, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its original three-judge
panel decision in which it held that these choice clauses were
void under the federal securities laws. 6 In 1986, these clauses
were contained in all new contracts, and inserted as an amend-
ment to all pre-existing contracts, between Lloyd's and individ-
uals Lloyd's recruited in the United States to invest in the
Lloyd's underwriting system. 7 The clauses require that all dis-
2 Hereinafter referred to as "Lloyd's." The Corporation of Lloyd's (also re-
ferred to as the Society of Lloyd's and the Council of Lloyd's) was established by
the Lloyd's Acts of 1871 to 1982. The Corporation of Lloyd's is the administrative
entity that provides the physical facilities and regulatory staff of the insurance
market, and also provides services such as accounting, preparation of policies, and
supervision of brokers. The Council of Lloyd's is the governing body of the society
and the corporation responsible for governance of the market. Appellees' Answer-
ing Brief at 10, Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997) (No.
95-5574). See also Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6888, at
*15; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,801 (S.D. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter, Richards f]. In
Richards I, the plaintiffs sued the Corporation of Lloyd's and the unincorporated
association of Lloyd's of London. See Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Opening Brief at 3 (cit-
ing Richards II, 107 F.3d 1422).
3 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1994) [hereinafter Se-
curities Act]. The Securities Act regulates public offerings of securities. It con-
tains the general requirement that all securities offered and sold to the public be
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as several ex-
emptions from the registration requirement. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURITIEs REGULATION 7 (2d ed. 1990).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1994) [hereinafter Securities Exchange Act]. The
Securities Exchange Act regulates the secondary market, or the market after an
issuer's securities are first sold to the public. The Securities Exchange Act created
the Commission and imposed upon it the responsibility of administering the Secur-
ities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. The Securities Exchange Act contains
many varied provisions, including provisions against fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. See HAZEN, supra note 3, at 7-8.
5 See Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414, 135 F.3d
1289 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 95-56467) [hereinafter Richards III].
6 See Richards III, at *1.
7 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d. at 1423. See infra part II for a description of the
Lloyd's system.
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putes arising out of the contracts be litigated in English courts
and pursuant to English Law.8 These clauses were inserted af-
ter two significant events: (1) Lloyd's exposure to claims due to
threatened litigation related to asbestos and other catastrophic
losses;9 and (2) Parliament's passage of the Lloyd's Act of 1982,
which grants Lloyd's immunity from certain liability in suits
filed by investors in the Lloyd's system.10 The purposes of this
article are to analyze the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Richards
111 and Richards III, discuss the present state of the law on
this issue, and explain how and why the law should be changed.
This article proposes that the law provide as follows: (1) the
anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act applies to all cases in
which a security is acquired in the United States; (2) the anti-
waiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act applies to all
cases in which a security is offered,1 2 purchased, 13 or sold14 in
the United States, and (3) neither anti-waiver provision can be
avoided by a choice of law clause, or by a forum selection clause
8 See id. at 1423.
9 See id. See also Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *20; infra note
37.
10 Lloyd's Act, 1982, ch. 14., § 14 (Eng.).
Section 14 provides that Lloyd's shall not be liable for damages for negli-
gence or other tort, breach of duty or otherwise, in respect of any exercise
of or omission to exercise any power, duty or function conferred or im-
posed by Lloyd's Acts 1871 to 1982 . . . (a) in so far as the underwriting
business of any member of the Society or the costs of his membership or
the business of any person as a Lloyd's broker or underwriting agent may
be affected unless the act or omission complained of (i) was done or omit-
ted to be done in bad faith. Id.
11 Compare Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1427 (striking down choice of law and
forum selection clauses) with Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir.
1996) (upholding choice of law and forum selection clauses) [hereinafter Allen II];
Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113
(1994); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 945
(1993); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995); Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021,
113 S. Ct. 658 (1992).
12 See § 2(3) of the Securities Act, 15 USC § 77b (defining "offer to sell," "offer
for sale," and "offer" to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation
of an offer to buy, a security, for value").
13 See § 3(a)(13) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC § 78c (defining "buy"
and "purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire").
14 See § 2(3) of the Securities Act, 15 USC § 77b (defining "sale" and "sell" to
include "every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security,
for value"); section 3(a)(14) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 USC § 78c (defining
"sale" and "sell" to include "any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of).
1998]
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where the chosen forum would not apply United States securi-
ties law.
Part II of this article provides an introduction to the Lloyd's
of London system and a brief explanation of the role of each par-
ticipant. Part III traces the history of Richards v. Lloyd's of
London and includes a discussion of the district court and Ninth
Circuit opinions. Part IV provides a critical analysis of the
Ninth Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions in Richards II
and Richards III. Part V summarizes some recent cases that
addressed this issue and one district court case which is set to
be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Part VI contains a proposal for dealing with the issue of the
anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act and the Securities
Exchange Act, as related to choice of law and forum selection
clauses, in future cases.
II. LLOYD'S OF LONDON AND THE UNITED STATES MARKET
Lloyd's, an English concern, operates a massive insurance
market. 15 Although Lloyd's does not underwrite insurance, it
manages the England based market in which agencies around
the world underwrite insurance. 16 Having begun in 1680, insur-
ing shipping risks out of a coffee house in London, the Lloyd's
market now has more than three hundred agencies competing
for underwriting business.17 Each underwriting agency, or syn-
dicate, is managed by a Managing Agent who is responsible for
the syndicate.18 In this capacity, the Managing Agent seeks un-
15 Lloyds' relationship to the insurance market it regulates has been analo-
gized to the New York Stock Exchange's regulatory relationship to the stock mar-
ket. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1357. See also Haynsworth v. Lloyd's of London, 933 F.
Supp. 1315, 1318 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter
Haynsworth I] (referring to Lloyd's as "an exchange - a place where people meet
to do business" and noting that its duties are regulatory and that Lloyd's is man-
aged by a board elected by its members) (citing ELIZABETH LUESSENHOP & MARTIN
MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS (1995); ADAM RAPHAEL, ULTIMATE RISK: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE LLOYD'S CATASTROPHE (1994); LLOYD'S OF LONDON MEMBERSHIP GUIDE, A
GUIDE TO CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP (Sept.1993); INTERNAL REPORT TO THE CHAIR-
MAN OF LLOYD'S, REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO SYNDICATE PARTICIPATIONS AND THE
LMX SPIRAL (1992)).
16 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *15.
17 See Allen 11, 94 F.3d at 926; Haynsworth 1, 933 F. Supp. at 1318; Richards
1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *15. In 1871, Lloyd's was incorporated by an act of
Parliament. See id.
18 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *15.
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derwriting business from brokers and raises capital to insure
the underwritten risks. 19 To obtain this capital, the Managing
Agent solicits investors to become members, called "Names."
The Names are represented in their dealings with the Manag-
ing Agent by the Members' Agent. The Names enter into a
Members' Agent's Agreement with the Members' Agent, a Man-
aging Agent's Agreement with the Managing Agent, and a Gen-
eral Undertaking with Lloyd's.20
The Names decide how much money to invest and in which
syndicates to participate. 21 Names are either inside (or work-
ing) Names or outside (or external) Names. 22 Inside Names are
active participants in the underwriting process; outside Names
are passive investors. 23 The outside Names invest a certain
amount of money in the syndicate. Usually this investment is
in the form of a letter of credit for an amount equal to a percent-
age of the premium income they expect to receive in a given
year from their underwriting syndicate. 24 Although the Names
are responsible only for their own share of a syndicate's loss,
they assume unlimited liability for that share.25
During the 1970's and 1980's, in an effort to expand its
business, Lloyd's recruited people in the United States to be-
come outside Names. 26 Americans who already were outside
Names were encouraged to recruit more Names in the United
States.27 Lloyd's efforts were successful insomuch as it raised
19 See id.
20 See id. at *17. The General Undertaking is the primary document estab-
lishing the Names' membership in the Lloyd's system. See Appellees' Answering
Brief at 10.
21 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *19.
22 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1424.
23 See id. See also Appellants' Opening Brief at 9 (stating that Names are
passive in that they do not issue policies or determine the amount of premiums
charged, nor do they meet with policyholders); Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Reply Brief at
12 (stating that "Names are completely prohibited by Lloyd's from any participa-
tion in the actual business of underwriting insurance") (citing Richards II, 107
F.3d at 1424).
24 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1424; Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888,
at *17.
25 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *19-20.
26 See Richards II, 107 F.3d at 1424; Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888,
at *20. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 5-6. (stating that this effort by Lloyd's to
recruit United States residents to invest in Lloyd's was initiated soon after pollu-
tion and asbestos claims under Lloyd's policies had begun to mount).
27 See Richards II, 107 F.3d at 1424.
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more than $600 million in letters of credit and deposits from
over 3,000 Americans who signed contracts to become outside
Names. 28 These outside names included Alan Richards and 573
other individuals.29
III. RICHARDS v. LLOYD'S OF LONDON
A. Background
In 1986, all new and pre-existing Lloyd's Names were re-
quired to sign a Members' Agent's Agreement and a General
Undertaking which contained two provisions previously absent
from these agreements. 30 Paragraph 2.1 of the General Under-
taking, the choice of law clause, states that: "[t]he rights and
obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to the Mem-
ber's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business
at, Lloyd's and any other matter referred to in this Undertak-
ing, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of England."31 Paragraph 2.2 of the General Undertaking,
the forum selection clause, states that: "[e]ach party irrevocably
agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever na-
ture arising out of or relating to the Member's membership of,
and/or underwriting of insurance business at Lloyd's...,,32
28 See id.
29 Hereinafter referred to collectively as the 'Plaintiffs." Although the district
court opinion states that there were 574 Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs state that there
were 609 Plaintiffs, 603 of which were recruited in the United States, "using face-
to-face meetings, telephone calls, correspondence and other means of solicitations."
Appellants' Opening Brief at 8-10. The Appellants' Opening Brief also states that
some of the Plaintiffs were parties in Roby, a case factually similar to Richards II,
and that collateral estoppel bars them from asserting that the anti-waiver provi-
sions of the federal securities laws, discussed below, preclude enforcement of the
choice clauses. See id. at 25-26, n.26. However, the Plaintiffs urge that the issue
of whether the clauses were procured by fraud was not decided in Roby and, there-
fore, none of the Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from making that claim here.
See id.
30 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1425; Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6888,
at *17.
31 Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *18 n. 11.
32 Id. The Members' Agent's Agreement contains similar provisions. See id.
at *17. When discussing both, the forum selection clause and the choice of law
clause will be referred to as the "choice clauses" or the "clauses." The Plaintiffs
claimed that the addition of the choice clauses was the only material change in
these agreements from the agreements that were used prior to 1986. Appellants'
Opening Brief at 13. Further, the Plaintiffs claimed that these agreements con-
[Vol. 10:31
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These clauses were inserted into the Lloyd's agreements
despite express statutory language contained in the U.S. securi-
ties laws which appears to prohibit enforcement of the clauses.
Specifically, Section 14 of the Securities Act provides as follows:
"[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person
acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision
of this title or of the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall be void." 33 Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
provides a similar anti-waiver provision.34 It reads: "[any con-
dition, stipulation or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this title or of any rule or regu-
lation thereunder ... shall be void." 35 Section 29(a) is broader
than Section 14 in that its application is not limited to persons
"acquiring" a security; presumably, it would also apply to per-
sons selling a security as well as persons to whom a security is
offered.
B. The District Court
On October 9, 1994, the Plaintiffs sued Lloyd's in federal
court in the Southern District of California. 36 The Plaintiffs al-
leged that Lloyd's failed to disclose that their syndicates rein-
sured high-risk asbestos and toxic waste claims that arose
before the Plaintiffs became Names.37 The Plaintiffs claimed
that Lloyd's violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal se-
curities laws by omitting this fact.38 The Plaintiffs further al-
taining the choice clauses were presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis," and that
they were given no explanation of the clauses' legal effect, nor were they given an
opportunity to negotiate on the agreements' terms. See id.
33 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994).
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994).
35 Id.
36 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1425.
37 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *11-12. The Plaintiffs alleged
that some of their losses were caused by the failure adequately to insure against
the risk of the Piper Alpha disaster and the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See id. at *10.
Other unexpected losses incurred by Lloyd's Names during the 1980's and 1990's
included Hurricane Hugo and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. See Allen 11, 94
F.3d at 927.
38 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *20-21. See also § 12(2) of the
Securities Act; § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act; Commission Rule 10b-5.
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent, part as follows:
Any person who ... (2) offers or sells a security ... by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
19981
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leged that Lloyd's violated the registration requirements of the
Securities Act.39 Finally, the Plaintiffs alleged that Lloyd's vio-
lated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communica-
tion, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
- shall be liable ... to the person purchasing such security from him ....
15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange .... (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.., any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to the Commission's rule making authority
granted by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
39 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *12. See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 (1994). See also § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933; 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994),
which generally prohibits the offer or sale of securities not registered with the
Commission, unless an exemption from registration applies. The purpose of the
registration process is for investors to have enough information about an issuer
make an informed decision about whether to purchase an issuer's securities. See
HAZEN, supra note 3, at 7. Violations of § 5 are actionable by private parties under
§ 12(1) of the Securities Act, See also 15 U.S.C. § 77(1)(1994).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/2
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of 197040 and state Blue Sky laws;41 the Plaintiffs also stated
claims for breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud.42
Relying on the forum selection clause, Lloyd's moved to dis-
miss the case based on improper venue43 claiming that the suit
could be brought only in England and pursuant to English
law. 44 The district court agreed, holding that forum selection
clauses are presumptively valid and should be voided only if
they are unreasonable under the circumstances. 45 The court re-
40 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *21; 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994)
[hereinafter RICO]. Passed in 1973, RICO was designed to eradicate organized
crime. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 ("It is the purpose of this Act to
seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibi-
tions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies .... ."). The statute,
however, covers far more conduct than organized crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (1994) (defining "Racketeering activity" as including, inter alia, acts or
threats involving murder, kidnaping, arson, mail fraud, fraud in the sale of securi-
ties, and the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable
under any law of the United States).
41 Blue Sky laws are the securities registration laws promulgated by each in-
dividual state. There are several explanations as to where the term "blue sky"
originated. One explanation is that the first such law was passed in Kansas in
1911 to "protect the Kansas farmers against the industrialists' selling them a piece
of the blue sky." HAZEN, supra note 3, at 6. Another explanation is that the pur-
pose of these laws is to prevent "speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of'blue sky.' "Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
42 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *21.
43 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3).
44 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *21. Alternatively, Lloyd's
sought dismissal based on forum non conveniens. Because it found the first
ground dispositive, the district court did not address the forum non conveniens
issue. See id. at *21-22. Similarly, because the Plaintiffs did not argue forum non
conveniens as a basis for not enforcing the forum selection clause, the court did not
consider the issue in this respect either. See id. at *26.
45 See id. at *24-25. Cf Ashenden v. Lloyd's of London, No. 96 C 852, 1996
WL 717464, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996) (finding forum selection clause reason-
able, therefore, enforceable) (citing Bonny, 3 F.3d 156). But see Baker v. LeBoeuf,
Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 105 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that counsel for
Lloyd's could not rely on forum selection clause in contracts between Names and
Lloyd's syndicate in action against law firm for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and
negligent representation/legal malpractice in connection with Names' investments
in Lloyd's); In re Lloyd's American Trust Fund Litigation, 954 F. Supp. 656, 669-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that trustee could not rely on forum selection clause in
contracts between Names and Lloyd's in action against trustee of premium funds
based on breach of contract and fiduciary duty because trustee was not "closely
related" to Lloyd's) (citing Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 1995);
Hugel v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1993)).
19981
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lied on Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 46 where the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed a simi-
lar complaint on the same grounds. In Roby, the Second Circuit
prescribed a four-part test to determine the enforceability of the
choice clauses. The clauses should not be enforced if any of the
four following prongs are present:
"(1) if their incorporation into the agreement was the result of
fraud or overreaching; 47 (2) if the complaining party 'will for all
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court,' due to grave
inconvenience or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) if the funda-
mental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a
remedy; or (4) if the clauses contravene a strong public policy of
the forum state."48
The District court found none of the four prongs present and
specifically concluded that there was no contravention of public
policy. As the Second Circuit had already found, the Names
were unable to show that the English remedies are inadequate
to deter the challenged conduct. 49
46 Roby, 996 F.2d 1353.
47 Appellants' Opening Brief at 34-36 (arguing that Lloyd's procured the
choice clauses by fraud). See also Tufts v. Corporation of Lloyd's, No. 95 Civ. 3480
(JFK), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12606, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1996) (granting
defendants' motion to dismiss based on plaintiffs' failure to provide sufficient evi-
dence showing that the forum selection and choice of law clauses in its contracts
with Lloyd's were procured through fraud) (citing Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6888, at *34 n.20; Haynsworth 1, 1996 U.S. Dist Lexis 9975, No. H-96-210,
slip op. at 8 (S.D. Tex. July 17, 1996)).
48 Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363.
49 See Appellants' Opening Brief at 41-42. The court also acknowledged the
Second Circuit's statement in Roby that the public policy argument is somewhat
diluted by the fact that the Commission has never taken any public action against
Lloyd's based on violations of the federal securities laws. See Roby, 996 F.2d at
1365-66. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 40. The Commission responded to this
point in an amicus curiae brief it submitted to the Ninth Circuit on behalf of the
Plaintiffs. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, amicus curiae,
at 24-27; Richards H, 107 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-5574) (stating that the
Commission cannot pursue all allegations of wrongdoing, and that private actions
serve as a necessary supplement to the Commission's enforcement program). See
also Appellants' Opening Brief at 30 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n. 19 (1985), where the Court gave no
indication that a public policy argument should be weakened simply because
neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the Department of Justice had taken
enforcement action in a case involving the federal antitrust laws.)
[Vol. 10:31
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C. The Court of Appeals in Richards II
1. The Majority
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit panel stated that it expressed
no view on whether the Names' agreements with Lloyd's consti-
tute securities within the meaning of the federal securities
laws. Assuming the Plaintiffs' allegations on this point to be
true, the court turned to the language of the anti-waiver provi-
sions of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.50
The court stated that "[t]he Choice Clauses [in the Lloyd's
agreements] operate to effect such waivers [proscribed by the
securities laws]. Accordingly, under the precise terms of these
two statutes, the Choice Clauses are void."51 Reversing the
lower court's grant of Lloyds' motion to dismiss the claims based
on the federal securities laws, the Ninth Circuit found the dis-
trict court made an error of law in deciding that the Choice
Clauses could be void only if unreasonable. 52 With striking def-
erence to Congress and a tone of distaste for the district court's
judicial activism, Circuit Judge Noonan exclaimed, "[uit was not
for a court to weigh . . . [the clauses'] reasonableness, [it was]
not for a court to say whether . . . [the clauses] offended any
policy of the United States. The policy decision [already] had
been made by the legislature."53
50 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc(a) (1994)).
51 Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426.
52 See id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Lloyds' mo-
tion to dismiss the claims based on state Blue Sky laws, common law fraud, and
breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 1431. The Plaintiffs proffered no anti-waiver
provision that would preserve these claims. See id. at 1430. Because the Ninth
Circuit found that the anti-waiver provisions do not apply to RICO, the court re-
manded to the district court to determine whether the choice clauses are reason-
able as they relate to the RICO scheme. See id.
53 Id. at 1426. Although reversed on appeal, the Eastern District of Virginia
maintained the same position on this issue. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, No.
3:96cv522, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *64 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1996) (in consid-
ering whether to engage in an analysis of the effect enforcement of choice clauses
would have on the public policy embedded in the federal securities laws, the court
stated, "it is neither permissible nor necessary for this court to substitute its own
public policy determinations for those made by Congress") [hereinafter Allen I].
See also Lloyd's Forum Selection and Choice of Law Clauses are Void Because They
Violate U.S. Securities Laws, Journal of Insurance Regulation, Fall 1997 (discuss-
ing Richards II and noting that Congress amended the Securities Act to cover in-
ternational transactions and that the 9th Cir. therefore felt it would be
inappropriate for a court to consider the reasonableness of applying U.S. securities
law to international transactions).
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The Ninth Circuit analyzed the case law put forth by the
litigants. First, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,54 the Supreme
Court held that in an international commercial transaction, a
clause requiring arbitration in Paris, France, for any contro-
versy or claim arising out of the agreement, should be upheld
despite the plaintiffs' reliance on the federal securities laws.55
The Ninth Circuit swiftly distinguished the facts of Scherk by
conducting a "contacts" analysis. The transaction in Scherk,
unlike those in Richards H, involved several contacts with at
least three different countries and only "fragmentary contacts"
with the United States.56 In addition to the factual differences,
the Ninth Circuit noted that in Scherk the Supreme Court was
faced with two conflicting federal statutes, the Arbitration Act 57
54 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Scherk involved a dispute which arose from the sale,
by a German citizen, of certain businesses to an American company. The Ameri-
can company, Alberto-Culver Co., manufactured and distributed toiletries and hair
products; the German citizen, Scherk, owned three companies that manufactured
and licensed trademarks for such products. Negotiations surrounding the transac-
tion took place in England, Germany, and the United States, and the contract was
signed in Austria and closed in Switzerland. See id. at 506. Alberto-Culver Co.
claimed that Scherk had violated the Securities Exchange Act by making certain
misrepresentations about encumbrances on trademarks which were transferred as
part of the sale. See id. at 509.
55 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426, (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. 506). See also
Transit Casualty Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 119 F.3d 619
(8th Cir. 1997). In Trans Casualty Co., the United States Court of Appeals, 8th
Cir., dismissed, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a case involving an
arbitration clause in a contract to which underwriters from Lloyd's of London were
parties. The case was originally filed in state court, then was removed to federal
court. See id. at 620. The district court then remanded based on lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See id. at 623. It reached this conclusion in part based on a
state statute which provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable except in
insurance contracts. Because the contract at issue was an insurance contract,
plaintiffs argued they were not bound by the arbitration clause. The district court,
after concluding that the state statute was not preempted by federal law, held that
plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration clause in the contract. See id. at 623-
24. As such, the federal statute, put forth by defendants as a means of removal to
federal court, was inapplicable. Therefore, the case was not properly before the
district court. The eighth circuit dismissed the appeal because, if the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court lacked subject matter juris-
diction to review the remand order. As a result, no substantive issues were de-
cided on appeal. See id. at 625.
56 See Richards H, 107 F.3d at 1426-27.
57 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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and the Securities Exchange Act.58 The Ninth Circuit found it
acceptable to disregard the anti-waiver provisions when there
are two conflicting federal statutes. It disagreed, however, with
the district court's decision to balance policy considerations
with an act of Congress, when there is only one statute.59 The
court underscored the difference between refusing to enforce the
anti-waiver provisions on policy grounds, and refusing to en-
force the provisions based on another federal statute.60 The for-
mer "represents judicial reasoning in the area where the federal
statutes, if they are to the contrary, must rule."
6 1
The Ninth Circuit panel then cited Mitsubishi Motors v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,62 where the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that when choice clauses operate in tandem as prospective
waivers of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for anti-
trust violations, they are void as against public policy. 63 The
Majority argued, by analogy, that the Supreme Court would in-
validate the choice clauses in Richards II because they would
operate in tandem as prospective waivers of the Plaintiffs'
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a (1994). See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1427 (citing Scherk,
417 U.S. at 517). The Scherk Court explained the conflicting policies of the Arbi-
tration Act and the Securities Exchange Act:
On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed "the need for avoiding
the delay and expense of litigation," and directed that such agreements be
"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" in federal courts. On the other hand,
the Securities Act of 1933 was "designed to protect investors" and to re-
quire "issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure
of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
to prevent fraud in their sale," by creating "a special right to recover for
misrepresentation . .. ."
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 512 (citing Wilco v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (citation and
footnotes omitted)).
59 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1427.
60 See id.
61 Id. See also Allen I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *60 (stating that
"where Congress has expressed a clear statement in a statute which is inconsistent
with the enforcement of choice of forum and choice of law clauses, those clauses
must not be enforced") (citing Union Insurance Society v. Elikon, 642 F.2d 721 (4th
Cir. 1981)). See also infra note 81.
62 473 U.S. 614. Mitsubishi Motors involved an action brought by an automo-
bile manufacturer against a dealer for certain claims based in contract. The
dealer's counterclaims alleged violations of antitrust and unfair competition stat-
utes. The Supreme Court held that the antitrust claims were subject to arbitra-
tion under the Arbitration Act. See id.
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rights to pursue remedies for federal securities law violations. 64
This is because enforcement of the forum selection clause would
lead an English court interpreting the choice of law clause to
preclude operation of the United States securities laws. 65 For
example, the court points to Section 12(2) of the Securities
Act,66 which places on the seller of securities the burden of prov-
ing lack of scienter when a buyer alleges fraud.67 Enforcing a
choice of law clause calling for the application of English law
would require the plaintiff to waive this substantive provision of
the federal securities laws because English law places the bur-
den on the Plaintiffs to prove Lloyd's (the seller) acted in bad
faith. As a result, the choice of law clause, interpreted by an
English court via the forum selection clause, must be void.68
Turning to the courts of other circuits that have decided
cases involving Lloyd's Names, Lloyd's cited Riley v. Kingsley
Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.6 9 The Ninth Circuit panel stated
simply that Riley did not discuss the anti-waiver provisions of
the federal securities laws and that the case involved an arbi-
tration clause not present here. Thus, the court concluded,
Riley is inapposite.70 The court cited cases from three other cir-
cuits with which, it acknowledged, it is now in conflict. 71 How-
64 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1427. But see Haynsworth I, 933 F. Supp. at
1323 ("When a party chooses to go to England to become an underwriter in Eng-
land, he probably chooses English laws and courts; this choice is not a waiver but a
consequence of independent, substantial choices otherwise made.").
65 See Commission Brief at 12 (citing Declaration of Kenneth Stuart Rokison
in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss). Mr. Rokison asserts that "it is 'Very unlikely'
that English courts would find the English choice of law clause 'avoidable'; and
that even if it were avoidable it seems 'highly likely' that English courts would
nevertheless apply English law; and that in applying English law, the English
courts will not apply United States legislation, i.e. the securities laws." See id.
66 See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
67 See Richards 1!, 107 F.3d at 1428 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
68 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1428. See also Appellants' Opening Brief at 22.
69 969 F.2d 953.
70 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1428.
71 See id. (citing Allen 11, 94 F.3d 923; Bonny, 3 F.3d 156; Roby, 996 F.2d
1353). For a discussion of these cases, see Darrell Hall, Note, No Way Out: An
Argument Against Permitting Parties to Opt out of U.S. Securities Laws In Interna-
tional Transactions, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 57 (1997). While the Ninth Circuit cites
cases from the Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits, three other circuits have en-
forced similar choice clauses in Lloyd's contracts. See, e.g., Haynsworth v. The
Corp., 1997 WL 534146 (5th Cir. 1997) [Hereinafter Haynsworth II], Shell, 55 F.3d
1227; Riley, 969 F.2d 953. Similarly, other district courts, including the Southern
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ever, the panel steadfastly asserted that those decisions were
decided wrongly, as those courts "improperly disregard[ed] the
statutory anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Acts."72
The Ninth Circuit majority claimed that the Second,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits all analyzed their cases improp-
erly based on Supreme Court precedent. 73 Specifically, the cir-
cuits relied on The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 74 and
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,75 which both held that a
forum selection clause should be enforced unless enforcement
would be unreasonable or unjust, or where the clause was pro-
cured by fraud or overreaching. 76 The circuits mentioned
above, relying on Bremen, reasoned that enforcement of such a
clause would be unreasonable if it would contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought. 77 The cir-
cuits held that the choice clauses in the Lloyd's agreements did
not contravene any public policy because the remedies available
under English law are "adequate to effectuate the anti-fraud
purposes of the American securities laws."7 8
Although it later engaged in a comparative analysis of the
American and English laws, the Ninth Circuit panel stated sim-
ply that the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws
obviate the need to assess the reasonableness of enforcing the
choice clauses. 79 The court highlighted the fact that in neither
Bremen nor Carnival Cruise Lines was the Court presented
with a statute that addressed the enforceability of an applicable
District of California in Richards I, have relied on the circuit court cases cited
above. See, e.g., Grace v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 1997 WL 607543 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
McDade v. NationsBank of Texas, Civ. No. H-94-3714, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21095 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 1995); Haynsworth, 933 F.Supp 1315.
72 Richards II, 107 F.3d at 1428.
73 See id. at 1428-29. See also Allen 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *53-58
(explaining why the Supreme Court precedent followed by other circuits in enforc-
ing the choice clauses in Lloyd's contracts is not applicable to the plaintiffs
(Names) because the combined effect of the choice clauses in this case is to waive
substantive statutory rights) (citing Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528. 115 S. Ct. 2322, 2328-30 (1995)).
74 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
75 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
76 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1428 (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. 1; Carnival, 499
U.S. 585).
77 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1428 (citing Allen 11, 94 F.3d at 928; Bonny, 3
F.3d at 160; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1363).
78 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1428.
79 See id. at 1428-29.
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statute.80 Unlike Richards I1,8l those cases provide a "reasona-
bleness" test in the absence of a pre-determined Congressional
mandate.
In finding that the laws of England are not as advanta-
geous to the Plaintiffs as the United States securities laws, the
Ninth Circuit panel was guided by the Commission, the agency
principally responsible for the administration and enforcement
of the federal securities laws.8 2 In an amicus curiae brief sub-
mitted to the Ninth Circuit in Richards II, the Commission
pointed out that English law does not provide a cause of action
for the failure to register securities, as is provided by Sections 5
80 See id. at 1429.
s' See id. See also Allen I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *59 ("In neither
Bremen nor any ensuing decision was the Supreme Court called upon to apply the
Bremen rule where Congress has expressed so clearly a public policy that is incon-
sistent with the enforcement of forum choice and choice of law clauses."). In Allen
I, the district court, discussing the "public policy" prong, stated that there are two
possibilities when a federal statute, such as the anti-waiver provision of the Secur-
ities Act, is contrary to the enforcement of choice clauses: (1) the anti-waiver provi-
sion may preclude the court from a public policy analysis altogether, or (2) the
provision may simply be evidence of the importance of the public policies underly-
ing the securities laws. See id. at *63-65. The court then cited the SEC's amicus
curiae brief for the proposition "that the anti-waiver provisions are not simply an
expression of public policy that favors United States securities laws unless other
comparable laws are available. Rather, . . . the provisions are an express and une-
quivocal directive that the rights and obligations under the securities laws cannot
be waived. Since this determination has been made by Congress, the courts are
not free to substitute their own public policy determinations." Id. at *63. The
court then concluded that the anti-waiver provision precluded the court from en-
gaging in a public policy analysis. See id. at *64. The court then cites Scherk, for
its finding that the statute should be considered evidence in the public policy anal-
ysis. Allen 1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *65 n.6.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court in Allen, stating that enforcing the choice clauses will not subvert
the federal securities laws' policy of prohibiting fraud. Allen, 94 F.3d at 929. The
Fourth Circuit went on to state that not only does English law also prohibit fraud,
but it provides Names adequate remedies for such fraud. See id. (citing Shell, 55
F.3d at 1231; Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365; Riley, 969 F.2d at 958).
However, the Fourth Circuit in Allen II also concluded that the Lloyd's plan at
issue was not a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws. See id.
at 930-32. As such, the anti-waiver provisions would not apply. Thus, the court's
analysis of the enforceability of the choice clauses is no different than the Supreme
Court's analysis in Bremen; that is, in the absence of a Congressional statement,
like the anti-waiver provisions, the courts must look to the "reasonableness" of
enforcing the choice clauses.
82 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 107 F.3d at 1429-30. See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984).
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and 12(1) of the Securities Act. 83 Although Lloyd's contended
that the registration requirements of the federal securities laws
are merely administrative,84 the Plaintiffs argued that "the af-
firmative disclosure duties that accompany registration lie 'at
the heart' of the [Securities] Act's scheme of regulation for pro-
tecting investors. "85
The Commission indicated that the remedies provided by
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act, for false or misleading state-
ments made in connection with the sale of securities, would be
"severely compromised" if the plaintiffs were forced to rely on
English law. 86 Under the Lloyd's Act of 1982, Lloyd's is immune
from any claims under England's Misrepresentations Act of
1967,87 absent a showing of bad faith.8 8 The Plaintiffs point out
that English courts refuse to hold Lloyd's liable for the failure to
disclose certain information because they reason that Lloyd's
owes no duty of disclosure to the Names. 89 Left to English law,
the Plaintiffs would be unable to bring an action based on
83 See Commission Brief at 20.
84 See Appellees' Answering Brief at 48. Cf Allen I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12300 (stating that "[a]lthough American courts have on occasion applied United
States securities laws' anti-fraud provisions to predominantly foreign transactions,
the 'anti-fraud provisions of American securities laws have broader extraterritorial
reach than American filing requirements."' (quoting Consolidated Gold Fields PLC
v. Minorco S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 262 (2d Cir.1989)). The Fourth Circuit in Allen II
then stated that "[t]his is because 'an interest in punishing fraudulent or manipu-
lative conduct is entitled to greater weight than are routine administrative re-
quirements.'" Allen 11, 94 F.3d at 930 (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 416 cmt. a (1986)).
85 Appellants' Reply Brief at 28-29 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 637-39
(1988)).
86 See Commission Brief at 20.
87 The Misrepresentations Act of 1967 provides remedies for certain types of
misrepresentations, including negligent misrepresentations. Misrepresentations
Act of 1967 (Eng.).
88 See id. Section 14 of the Lloyd's Act, 1982, provides that Lloyd's shall not be
liable for damages
[I] or negligence or other tort, breach of duty or otherwise, in respect of any
exercise of or omission to exercise any power, duty or function conferred or
imposed by Lloyd's Acts 1871 to 1982 . . in so far as the underwriting
business of any member of the Society or the costs of his membership or
the business of any person as a Lloyd's broker or underwriting agent may
be affected... unless the act or omission complained of -was done or omit-
ted to be done in bad faith. Lloyd's Act, 1982, ch. 14, § 14 (Eng.).
89 See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 30.
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breach of the duty to disclose; however, under the Securities
Act,90 such an action may be brought.
2. The Dissent
Judge Goodwin, the sole dissenter among the Ninth Circuit
panel, chastised the majority for assuming, based merely on the
Plaintiffs' allegation, that the agreements entered into between
the Names and Lloyd's constitute "securities" as that term is
defined in the federal securities laws.9 1 The anti-waiver provi-
sion of the Securities Act applies to any "person acquiring any
security. '92 If the court relies on the Plaintiffs' allegations,
Judge Goodwin argued, the protection of the federal securities
laws would apply "to any one who loses his or her savings bet-
ting on chicken fights in Zamboanga. ''93 The District court did
not analyze the issue, but simply stated that it was not neces-
sary for resolving the issue before the court.9 4 Presumably, the
90 See id. at 30-32.
91 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1431.
92 Id. See also 15 U.S.C. 77n (1994).
93 Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1431. Similarly, Lloyd's argued that the anti-
waiver provisions of the federal securities laws should not enable a plaintiff to
nullify choice clauses simply by asserting claims under those laws. See Appellees'
Answering Brief at 23-24. Cf. Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 999 F.2d 206, 211 (7th Cir.
1993) (quoting with approval Roby, 996 F.2d at 1360, "[it defies reason to suggest
that a plaintiff may circumvent forum selection ... merely by stating claims under
laws not recognized by the forum selected in the agreement. A plaintiff simply
would have to allege violations of his country's statutory law or his country's ...
property law in order to render nugatory any forum selection clause that implicitly
or explicitly required the application of the law of another jurisdiction.").
94 See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *11. Similarly, the court
refused to address Lloyds' argument that the Plaintiffs had mischaracterized the
Lloyd's market as a common enterprise, a necessary element of an "investment
contract," one of the terms used in the securities acts to define a "security." Id. See
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994) (defining "security"); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1994). See Ap-
pellants' Opening Brief at 6-7 (explaining how the Lloyd's system constitutes a
"common enterprise"); Appellants' Reply Brief at 11 (stating the position of the
California Department of Corporations, the agency which enforces the California
state securities laws, that Lloyd's offered and sold securities (citing Letter pursu-
ant to Ninth Circuit Rule 29-1 Advisory Committee Note (June 20, 1996))); Allen I,
1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12300, at *140-69 (analyzing, in action for injunctive relief,
whether it is reasonably likely that Names' investments in Lloyd's constitute se-
curities, and concluding in the affirmative). But see Allen 1I, 94 F.3d at 930-32
(reversing district court's conclusion that the Lloyd's plan at issue involved securi-
ties); California Commissioner of Insurance, Amicus Curiae Brief at 15-22, Rich-
ards 11, 107 F.3d 1422 (No. 95-55747) (arguing that Names' investments in the
Lloyd's system do not constitute securities).
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district court would enforce the choice clauses even if the juris-
dictional issue of whether there is a "security" were undisputed;
that is, it would allow the choice clauses to trump the anti-
waiver provisions of the federal securities laws.95
Addressing the anti-waiver provisions, Judge Goodwin en-
gaged in an "International v. Domestic" analysis; he concluded
that the contract at issue, contrary to the majority's conclusion,
is an international transaction.96 As such, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Bremen,97 that forum selection clauses in contracts
that are fundamentally international in character are presump-
tively valid, should control.98 Judge Goodwin stated that the
choice clauses could be voided if English law does not provide
adequate remedies to deter fraud upon American Names.99 In
stark contrast to the majority's mandate, Judge Goodwin
deemed the case appropriate for "judicial balancing."' 0 0 In the
balance, Judge Goodwin weighed the remedies available in
England against the public policy behind the American securi-
ties laws.' 0 ' Judge Goodwin concluded, consistently with the
other circuit courts that have addressed the issue, 10 2 that the
laws of England provide adequate remedies for any fraud perpe-
trated upon American Names. 10 3
Judge Goodwin noted that English law provides remedies,
including rescission, for fraudulent, negligent, and even inno-
95 The essence of the majority's opinion is that, where Congress has spoken
(via the anti-waiver provisions) the courts should not supplant the policy decisions
of Congress with its own. See supra part III.C.1. In order for the federal securities
laws to apply, thus invoking the anti-waiver provisions, there must be a "security."
Regardless of whether the majority was correct in assuming the truth of the Plain-
tiffs allegation that Lloyd's offered and sold "securities," the court knew that this
threshold must be crossed before analyzing whether the anti-waiver provisions
could even apply. See id.
96 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1432. But see Appellants' Reply Brief at 16
(claiming that the transactions at issue are essentially domestic).
97 See generally 407 U.S. 1.
98 See Richards II, 107 F.3d at 1432. But see Appellants' Reply Brief at 18-19
(citing Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (arguing that the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws do not
provide an exemption for "truly international" transactions and that deference
should be given to the SEC's interpretation of the issue)).
99 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1433.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 1434-35.
102 See id. at 1428. See also supra note 71.
103 Id. See also Appellees' Answering Brief at 37-43.
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cent misrepresentation, and penalties for misleading state-
ments made knowingly or recklessly. 10 4 Further, the exemption
Lloyd's enjoys under the Lloyd's Act of 1982 does not apply to
acts done in bad faith.10 5 Since fraud requires bad faith, Judge
Goodwin concluded Lloyd's remains liable in damages for
fraud. 10 6 Similarly, English law imposes obligations on Mem-
bers' Agents to provide the Names full information pertaining
to the underwriting syndicates, with breach of contract reme-
dies for failure to disclose. 0 7
Because Lloyd's recruits Names in many different coun-
tries, Judge Goodwin argued that Lloyd's utilized the choice
clauses to prevent it from being subject to the laws of every ju-
risdiction, and from being amenable to suit in all jurisdictions,
in which it does business.10 8 As a result of nullifying the choice
clauses, Judge Goodwin posits, the majority's holding will "in-
ject counterproductive uncertainty" into the Lloyd's market-
place.10 9 Further, Judge Goodwin suggested that without the
certainty of the choice clauses, Lloyd's may not engage in the
kind of insurance market which it operates."10 Judge Goodwin
argued that notions of international comity and respect for the
integrity and competence of foreign tribunals should lead the
court to enforce the clauses.'11
Judge Goodwin last addressed the majority's ruling to re-
mand the RICO issue.112 Judge Goodwin engaged in a balanc-
ing test here as well, and concluded that although the United
States provides treble damages 113 (unlike England), the Eng-
lish remedies are adequate to prevent the conspiracy alleged by
104 See Richards H, 107 F.3d at 1435. See also English Financial Services Act,
1986, ch. 60, § 47 (Eng.). But see supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
105 See supra note 88.
106 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1435. See also Appellees' Answering Brief at
39. But see supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
107 See Richards H, 107 F.3d at 1435. See also Appellees' Answering Brief at
39.
108 See Richard's II, 107 F.3d at 1432-33.
109 Id. at 1432.
110 See id. at 1433.
111 See id. But see Appellees' Answering Brief at 41(quoting Riley, 969 F.2d at
958, "our courts have long recognized that the courts of England are fair and neu-
tral forums").
112 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426. See also supra note 52.
113 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c). "Any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
[Vol. 10:31
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol10/iss1/2
FORUM SELECTION AND CHOICE OF LAW
the Plaintiffs. 114 As a result, Judge Goodwin concluded this is-
sue should not have been remanded and argued further that it
defies reason to suggest that a plaintiff can invalidate choice
clauses in a contract simply by alleging a claim under RICO.115
D. The Court of Appeals in Richards III
1. The Majority
From sole dissenter in Richards II, Judge Goodwin became
the drafter of the majority opinion in Richards III. Judge Good-
win first summarized the Names' arguments as to why the
court should not enforce the choice clauses: "[The Names con-
tend] (1) that the antiwaiver provisions of the federal securities
laws void [the choice] clauses; (2) that the choice clauses are
invalid because they offend the strong public policy of preserv-
ing an investor's remedies under federal and state securities
law and RICO; and (3) that the choice clauses were obtained by
fraud."116
The court begins its analysis by stating that Bremen gov-
erns the validity of choice clauses in international agree-
ments.117 Relying on Scherk and Haynsworth, Judge Goodwin
concludes that the transactions between Lloyd's and the Names
were international.118 The Names had argued that Lloyd's in-
sistence that the Names go to England to sign their contracts is
merely a ritual and does not render the transactions interna-
tional. In rejecting this argument, Judge Goodwin asserts that
Lloyd's does this so that the Names will understand that Eng-
lish law governs the transactions. 119 Judge Goodwin acknowl-
edges the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws,
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages
he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
114 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1435-36.
115 See id. Judge Goodwin concurred in the part of the majority's opinion af-
firming the dismissal of the Blue Sky law, common law fraud, and breach of fiduci-
ary duty claims, and agreed that the choice clauses were not procured by fraud.
See id. at 1436.
116 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414, at *6-7.
117 See id. at *7 and n. 1.
118 See id. at *9-11.
119 Id. at *12.
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but simply states that the Court in Bremen contemplated that a
choice clause may conflict with certain statutes.
120
Judge Goodwin states that the Ninth Circuit is following
the other six circuits that have enforced similar choice
clauses. 12 1 Applying Bremen, Judge Goodwin rejects the Names'
argument that the choice clauses contravene a strong public
policy of American securities law. 122 In rejecting this argument,
Judge Goodwin quotes the Supreme Court's conclusion in
Scherk that "[tlo require that 'American standards of fairness'
must. . . govern the controversy demeans the standards of jus-
tice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalts the pri-
macy of United States law over the laws of other countries."
1 23
Judge Goodwin notes the Court's dictum in Mitsubishi Motors
that choice clauses should be voided as against public policy
where they would operate in tandem as a prospective waiver of
a party's rights. 124 However, he simply concludes that the
Scherk Court's reasoning outweighs the dictum in Mitsubishi
Motors.125
The majority then addresses the respective remedies pro-
vided by American and English law, concluding that English
law is not so deficient as to deprive the Names of any reasonable
recourse.' 26 Judge Goodwin explains that the Names can pur-
sue actions against the Members' Agents and Managing Agents
for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or negligent misrepresenta-
tion.127 As in his dissenting opinion in Richards II, Judge Good-
win notes that Lloyd's can still be sued for actions done in bad
faith, including fraud.128 Last, Judge Goodwin concluded that
(1) the RICO claim does not alter the court's holding, and (2) the
inclusion of the choice clauses in the Lloyd's contracts was not
the product of fraud.129
120 See id. at *8-9.
121 See id. at *14.
122 See Richards III, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414 at *13.
123 Id. at *16, quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517 n.11.
124 See id. at *17.
125 Id. 18.
126 See id. at *19.
127 See id.
128 Richards III, 1998 App. LEXIX 1414 at *20, citing Lloyd's Act of 1982, Ch.
14(3)(e)(i).
129 Id. at *20-23.
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2. The Dissent
Judge Sidney R. Thomas, joined by Judges Pregerson and
Hawkins, dissented from the majority opinion in Richards III.
The dissent articulates five main reasons for its position: (1) be-
cause Congress explicitly resolved the question at hand, the ma-
jority was wrong in applying the Bremen Court's policy
analysis; (2) a holding contrary to the majority would not give
American securities law boundless reach; (3) the case law relied
upon by the majority is distinguishable and thus should not
control; (4) the choice clauses are unenforceable because Ameri-
can securities law provides remedies far greater than those pro-
vided by English law; and (5) additional public policy reasons
weigh in favor of enforcing the anti-waiver provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws.
Judge Thomas claims that the anti-waiver provisions do
not simply declare "a strong public policy" against the waiver of
compliance with American securities laws. 130 Rather, these pro-
visions unconditionally prohibit such a waiver.131 Judge
Thomas claims that, via the anti-waiver provisions, Congress
adopted "a per se rule that American laws cannot be ignored in
this context. Courts should not employ amorphous public policy
to emasculate plain statutory language."132 Judge Thomas con-
tends that disregarding the anti-waiver provisions "to assess
whether enforcement of the choice clauses contravenes the un-
derlying policy against waiver is akin to overlooking the plain
language of a statute to consider its legislative history."1 33
Judge Thomas then argues that enforcing the anti-waiver
provisions will not result in "boundless" reach of the American
securities laws. First, he notes that any plaintiff seeking to rely
on the federal securities laws would still have to meet the basic
jurisdictional elements of those laws, for instance, by establish-
ing that the transactions at issue involve "securities" within the
meaning of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act.' 34 Further, Judge Thomas points out that the transactions
130 See id. at *24.
131 See id.
132 Id. at *25.
133 Richards I, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414 at *26, citing Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146 (1992).
134 Id. at *27.
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at issue involve substantial U.S. connections, thereby justifying
application of American securities law. 135 Moreover, Congress
intended the Securities Acts to have international applica-
tion.136 Accordingly, the Names should be afforded the protec-
tion of American law, and Lloyd's should not be surprised by its
application.
Next, Judge Thomas discussed the case law. First, he notes
distinctions between Scherk and Richards. Scherk involved a
forum selection clause calling for arbitration in Paris, France,
but a choice of law clause calling for application of the law of
Illinois, U.S.A. 137 In Richards, both the forum selection and
choice of law clauses favored England and English law, respec-
tively. 138 Because of this distinction, Judge Thomas argued,
Scherk is not binding, and any implicit approval by the Scherk
Court of a "hypothetical choice-of-law clause" calling for foreign
law is merely dicta.139 In addition, and related to the previous
argument, Judge Thomas pointed out that Scherk involved
many more connections with foreign countries, unlike Richards,
which involved mostly contacts with the U.S.' 4 0
The dissent responded to the majority's treatment of Mit-
subishi Motors and Vimar. Although the majority noted that
the pertinent language in Mitsubishi Motors was merely dicta,
the Court reiterated the same position in Vimar, a case involv-
ing a very different set of facts. 141 As such, the majority improp-
erly construed these cases too narrowly. Further, to the extent
that the Scherk Court's reasoning cited by the majority was
dicta, it should be entitled to no greater weight than the Court's
reasoning in Mitsubishi Motors.
Judge Thomas next claimed that the choice clauses should
be voided because they are unreasonable under the circum-
stances, in that English law provides far less protection to
American investors than does American law. 142 Relying on Mit-
subishi Motors and Vimar, both rejected by the majority, Judge
135 See id.
136 See id. *35-36.
137 See id. at *28.
138 Id. at *28-29.
139 Richards III, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIX 1414 at *29.
140 Id. at *29-30.
141 Id. at *33-34.
142 See id. at *30-31.
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Thomas states that these cases "militate[ ] against enforcing
the choice clauses." 143 Judge Thomas noted examples of differ-
ences between American and English law: (1) English law pro-
vides no remedy for failing to register securities, unlike Section
12(1) of the Securities Act; (2) English law provides no remedy
against Lloyd's for negligent misrepresentation, unlike Section
12(2) of the Securities Act; and (3) English law provides no
cause of action for control person liability, unlike Section 15 of
the Securities Act and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act. 144 Last, although the majority noted that it is simply unfor-
tunate for the Names that the Members' Agents and Managing
Agents may be insolvent, the dissent pointed out that this is
more evidence that English law is inadequate to address the
Names' grievances. 145
The dissent set forth additional policy reasons for refusing
to enforce the choice clauses. First, "[e]nforcing the choice
clauses gravely disadvantages American businesses, because
foreign businesses, like Lloyd's, can recruit investors without
expending the time and money involved in fulfilling the require-
ments of the [American securities] Acts - a burden that Ameri-
can businesses cannot legally evade." 146 The dissent notes that
the federal securities laws were designed in part to prevent a
recurrence of the "dire national distress" that ensued in the af-
termath of the 1929 market crash; many American investors
had lost millions of dollars as a result of incomplete and false
representations. 147 The dissent urges that this legislative his-
tory "drives home the necessity for invalidating the choice
clauses." 148 Judge Thomas concludes that "[ilincreasing access
to international capital markets is a laudable goal, but one need
not trample on United States securities laws to achieve it ...
Indeed, the facts alleged in this case make a powerful argument
for vigorous application of American securities laws. A com-
pany, whether foreign or domestic, should not be able to mis-
lead American investors with impunity." 4 9
143 Id.
144 See id. at *32.
145 See Richards III, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414 at *32 n. 1.
146 Id. at *33.
147 See id. at *35, citing S. Rep. No. 47, at 2 (1933).
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IV. CRITIQUE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING IN RICfIRDS
V. LLOYDS OF LONDON
The purpose of this section is to analyze the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Richards II and Richards III. The first issue in-
volves the court's treatment of the case law. The second issue
deals with the court's interpretation of Congress' intent in
drafting the anti-waiver provisions. The third issue involves
the court's finding that English law, compared to American law,
adequately protects American investors. Finally, the last issue
covers several policy factors discussed in the various opinions.
In Richards III, Judge Goodwin echoed his dissent from
Richards II in holding that the Bremen Court's reasonableness
test should be used to decide whether to enforce the choice
clauses. The majority in Richards II had rejected this test
based on its position that the anti-waiver provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws obviated the need to assess the reasonable-
ness of enforcing the choice clauses. 150 Holding true to his
original view, Judge Goodwin concluded that the transactions
at issue were international and, therefore, Bremen should
control.
Although the majority in Richards II simply argued that
Bremen did not apply because of the express language of the
anti-waiver provisions, the dissent in Richards III expanded on
this view by emphasizing the American connections as justifica-
tion for distinguishing this case from Bremen. Further, in its
discussion of Scherk, the majority in Richards II was careful to
distinguish those facts from the facts in Richards.15' The main
distinctions were that the transaction in Scherk was primarily
international in character, based on the contacts with foreign
countries, unlike the transactions in Richards 11.152 Adding to
these distinctions, the dissent in Richards III noted that
although the forum selection clause in Scherk called for a for-
150 See Richards 1I, 107 F.3d at 1428-29; Allen I, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300,
at *59. See also supra note 81
151 See generally Scherk, 417 U.S. 506. See also supra notes 54-61 and accom-
panying text.
152 Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426 (citing Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.) See also supra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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eign forum, the choice of law clause called for application of do-
mestic law. 153
The Ninth Circuit's original opinion noted that the Bremen
Court was acting without guidance from Congress. 5 4 As such,
the Bremen Court was free to reason its way to what it believed
was a just result. Had there been an applicable statute, such as
the Securities Act's anti-waiver provision, the Bremen Court,
via the Ninth Circuit panel's reasoning, would have been less
able to craft its own formula for resolving the issue. Similarly,
had the Scherk Court been faced with only one statute, rather
than two conflicting statutes, it too, would have had less flexi-
bility in reaching its outcome. The dissent in Richards III
echoed its view that Bremen was inapplicable because of the
presence of the anti-waiver provisions and that Scherk was in-
applicable because it was factually distinguishable from
Richards. 155
The Ninth Circuit panel in Richards II took an interesting
approach to Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,156 a
Tenth Circuit case cited by Lloyd's. Dismissing the case sum-
marily as inapposite, the majority stated simply that Riley in-
volved an arbitration clause not present in Richards II, and the
Riley court did not discuss the anti-waiver provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws.' 57 However, the majority took the time to
carefully distinguish Richards II from Scherk, a case which, like
Riley, also involved an arbitration clause and which barely
mentioned the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities
laws. 58 Perhaps the panel was merely being more deferential
to the Supreme Court, as it must, but its limited treatment of
Riley undermines its reasoning for not following Scherk. Inter-
estingly, although the majority in Richards III noted the Tenth
Circuit's position in Riley, 59 it did not expressly rely on any
portion of the Riley opinion.
153 Richards III, at *25-30,
154 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d 1428-29. See also supra notes 73-81 and accom-
panying text.
155 Richards III, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1414 at 25-30.
156 Riley, 969 F.2d 953.
157 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d 1428.
158 See id. at 1427.
159 Richards III, at *13-14.
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Relying on Mitsubishi Motors, the majority in Richards H
found that the choice clauses would operate in tandem as a pro-
spective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies
under the federal securities laws. 160 In some cases, one could
argue that either alone, rather than both clauses "operating in
tandem," would operate as such a prospective waiver of a
party's right. For example, if there is only a forum selection
clause, and the chosen forum would apply U.S. securities law,
respecting the U.S. anti-waiver provisions, the forum selection
clause would not pose a problem. If, however, the chosen forum
would not apply U.S. securities law, even in the absence of a
choice of law clause, as is likely the case with English courts, 16'
the anti-waiver provisions would render the forum selection
clause void. As examples of this reasoning, the majority in
Richards H cited Supreme Court cases holding that arbitration
clauses were enforceable because the arbitrators applied the
substantive securities laws of the U.S. where applicable. 62
Similarly, if there is only a choice of law clause, opting for law
as favorable to the plaintiffs as U.S. securities law, then the
choice of law clause would be enforced. If, however, the chosen
law is less favorable than U.S. securities law, the anti-waiver
provisions would render the choice of law clause void, as it
would operate as a prospective waiver of a party's right. In any
event, while noting the struggle in grappling with Mitsubishi
Motors, the majority in Richards III espoused the controlling
view in the Ninth Circuit that the language in Mitsubishi Mo-
tors was mere dicta.' 63
The majority in Richards H paid great deference to Con-
gress in holding that the anti-waiver provisions must control.
The panel believed it was not the court's place to conduct a pol-
icy analysis because Congress conducted that analysis when it
passed the anti-waiver provisions as part of the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act. The court emphasized that
cases like Bremen and Carnival Cruise Lines provide a "reason-
ableness" test in the absence of a pre-determined Congressional
160 Id.
161 See supra notes 65 and 221.
162 See Richards H, 107 F.3d at 1427 (citing Rodriguez de QuiJas; Shearson/
American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232, reh'g den. (1987)).
163 Richards III, at *17-18.
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mandate. Similarly, the dissent in Richards III argued force-
fully that through the anti-waiver provisions, Congress adopted
a "per se" rule that agreements such as the choice clauses are
unenforceable.
In spite of the statutory language contained in the anti-
waiver provisions, the Ninth Circuit enforced the choice
clauses. However, the Court did not provide a clear standard
for courts confronted with this issue in the future. The court's
only guidance as to when choice clauses might not be enforced is
its statement that, "were English law so deficient that the
Names would be deprived of any reasonable recourse, we would
have to subject the choice clauses to another level of scru-
tiny."164 Problems can arise when a court, as the Ninth Circuit
here, draws its own boundaries to laws whose boundaries al-
ready have been drawn by Congress. Nowhere in its opinion
does the court define "any reasonable recourse," whereas the
anti-waiver provisions enunciate a precise mandate obviating
the need for judicial line-drawing. Nor does the court suggest
exactly what "another level of scrutiny" would involve.
The problem with the Ninth Circuit's holding becomes ap-
parent when taken to its logical extension. As per Richards III,
if an American investor signs a contract containing choice
clauses with a foreign party in that party's country, the transac-
tion is international. If the transaction is international,
Bremen controls the issue of whether or not to enforce choice
clauses. Under Bremen, the American courts will enforce the
clauses unless it would be unreasonable to do so. Enforcing a
choice clause would be unreasonable if doing so would contra-
vene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.
According to the Ninth Circuit, a strong public policy of the
United States courts is that American investors have "any rea-
sonable recourse" when they have been wronged. Thus, under
Richards III, if a foreign company solicits investors in the U.S.
and takes them back to corporate headquarters to sign the con-
tracts, the transaction is international, and Bremen controls. If
the contracts contain choice clauses calling for application of
foreign law, the clauses will be enforced as long as the chosen
law provides "any reasonable recourse" to the investors.
164 Richards III, at *19 (emphasis added).
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Aside from the likely confusion in discerning whether in-
vestors will have "any reasonable recourse," there are a few
dangerous results likely to emanate from the court's reasoning.
First, foreign companies will take advantage of this holding.
When soliciting American investors, they will be sure to estab-
lish some contact between the investors and the foreign country
in order to qualify the transactions as international. Such com-
panies will make sure they include choice clauses in their con-
tracts favoring law less investor-protective than U.S. law.
These steps will enable foreign companies to avoid the effort
and expense of complying with U.S. securities laws, to the detri-
ment of American investors. Second, American enterprises may
seek to incorporate overseas in order to solicit American inves-
tors without having to comply with U.S. securities laws. Simi-
lar abuses already have occurred, for example, with Regulation
S under the Securities Act. 165 American companies have offered
securities ostensibly to foreign investors; the "foreign" inves-
tors, often Americans who establish off-shore accounts to effect
the purchases of "Reg-S" stock, then sell the securities back into
the U.S. market after a prescribed waiting period. This type of
abuse allows the company to offer its securities to American in-
vestors while circumventing the rigorous registration and dis-
closure requirements of the U.S. securities laws.
Although the majority panel in Richards II relied heavily
on the judgement of the Commission in holding that English
law is not as favorable as American law for remedying the
Plaintiffs' injuries, 166 the majority in Richards III did not even
acknowledge the Commission's position. The following table
represents a comparison of the Plaintiffs' possible bases for pur-
suing legal action against Lloyd's and the respective remedies
available under English and American law:
165 cite and explain Reg S
166 See id. at 1429-30. See also supra notes 82-90, and accompanying text.
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TYPE OF
CONDUCT ENGLISH REMEDY AMERICAN REMEDY
Failure to Regis- None Available. § 5 of Securities Act, via §12 (a)(1) of
ter Securities Securities Act. Plaintiff can seek
damages 1 6 7 or rescission.
Negligent Misrep- Common Law and Misrepresenta- §12(a) (2) of Securities Act. Plaintiff
resentation tions Act of 1967; Lloyd's immune can seek damages or rescission.
1 6 8
under § 14 of Lloyd's Act of 1982. Burden on seller/defendant to prove
Plaintiff can sue Members' and exercise of reasonable care, and/or
Managing Agents; Burden on buyer/ absence of loss causation.
plaintiff to prove negligence.
Intentional Mis- Common Law and Misrepresenta- §12 (a)(2) of Securities Act;
1 6 9
representation tions Act of 1967; plaintiff must §10(b) and 18(a) of Securities
prove bad faith. Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5; for
§10(b) and Rule 10b-5, plaintiff can
seek damages or rescission and/or
injunction and must prove scien-
ter.
1 7 0
General Fraud Financial Services Act of 1986; §10(b) of Securities Exchange Act
Lloyd's immune under § 42. and Rule 10b-5.171
Control Person None Available. § 15 of Securities Act; § 20 of Securi-
Liability ties Exchange Act. Both hold con-
trol persons liable for the violations
of thepersons subject to their con-
trol. 1
7 2
As the table illustrates, American law provides more reme-
dies for plaintiffs seeking recovery against Lloyd's in the context
167 The amount of damages recoverable under § 12(a)(1) depends on whether
the plaintiff still owns the securities. If so, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the purchase price with interest, less any income received thereon, upon tender of
the securities. If not, plaintiff may recover the difference between the purchase
price and the resale price. See §§ 12(a)(1), (a)(2); HAZEN, supra note 3 at § 7.2, p.
276-77.
168 Damages in an action for violation of § 12(1) are calculated in the same
manner as in an action for violation of § 12(1). See id. § 7.5, at p. 300-01.
169 In an action alleging intentional misrepresentation in violation of
§ 12(a)(2), plaintiffs' remedies are generally the same as in an action for negligent
misrepresentation as described above. See supra (previous two notes).
170 See § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; See
generally, HAZEN, supra note 3, at ch. 13. Damages in actions alleging violations of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are calculated in any number of different ways, depending
on the factual circumstances and the particular court. The following are examples
of methods courts have used: out-of-pocket; benefit of the bargain; rescissory dam-
ages; and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. See Id. at §13.7, p. 714-15.
171 The remedies available under these provisions are the same as provided in
note 170 supra. Additionally, § 9 of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits certain
conduct designed to manipulate security prices. Affected persons may sue persons
who violate § 9(e).
172 See § 15 of the Securities Act; § 20 of the Securities Exchange Act; HAZEN,
supra note 3, at § 7.7, p. 309.
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of cases like Richards. Although there is some overlap in the
protection provided by both sets of laws, certain remedies, such
as failing to register securities and control person liability, sim-
ply are not recognized in English law. Further, for certain
causes of action under English law, such as negligent misrepre-
sentation, Lloyd's is immune from liability. Thus, although a
plaintiff might be entitled to more protection in a suit against
another defendant, acts of English Parliament render the
Lloyd's cases unique since the full panoply of English remedies
is unavailable.
In Richards III, Judge Goodwin did not repeat his argu-
ment that the choice clauses must be enforced, lest Lloyd's be
subject to suit in all jurisdictions in which it does business. 173 In
Richards H, the majority noted that "Lloyd's voluntarily ac-
cepted the burdens of United States litigation - no matter how
disruptive - by soliciting investments from thousands of inves-
tors in the United States."17 4 Further, in his argument, Judge
Goodwin, cognizant of the Plaintiffs allegations, did not discuss
the fact that Lloyd's inserted the choice clauses in all Names
contracts in 1986, after the passage of legislation which immu-
nized Lloyd's from certain liability and after Lloyd's learned of
the potential losses from asbestos and other toxic injury
claims. 175 The Plaintiffs asserted, as did the plaintiffs in the
other pertinent cases against Lloyd's (and its affiliated entities),
that the fraud perpetrated by Lloyd's consisted, in part, of in-
serting these clauses in contracts for Names who were put un-
knowingly in syndicates fraught with potential losses based on
high exposure disaster claims.176 Therefore, Lloyd's was aware
of the potential for litigation in the United States and chose to
173 See Richards 1I, 107 F.3d 1432.
174 Appellants' Reply Brief at 35.
175 See Appellants' Opening Brief at 11-14 (Plaintiffs argue that Lloyd's was
trying to prevent the Plaintiffs from learning about the potential exposure to these
losses at least until it succeeded in getting Parliament to enact the Lloyd's Act of
1982.). See also Leslie v. Lloyd's, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15380, at *87-88 (stating
that the insertion of the forum selection clause in the Lloyd's contracts coincides
with Lloyds' efforts to seek passage of the Lloyd's Act of 1982, and the clause was
mandated "just as reports started to surface that American Names planned to sue
Lloyd's, and shortly before it became impossible for Lloyd's to continue concealing
the extent of its problems") rev'd, Haynsworth H, 121 F.3d 956.
176 See Richards I, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6888, at *10, 20. See also supra note
37 and accompanying text.
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continue doing business there anyway. It would be far from un-
fair to subject Lloyd's to litigation in such places under these
circumstances.
Similarly absent from Richards III is Judge Goodwin's ar-
gument that if Lloyd's cannot rely on the choice clauses, it may
not continue its business the way it has. 177 This argument over-
looks the fact that Lloyd's had been operating successfully
world-wide for more than 300 years prior to the insertion of the
choice clauses in its Names contracts. 178 As the majority in
Richards II pointed out, even if the choice clauses are voided,
"Lloyd's will go on writing insurance as long as the business is
profitable;" 79 Lloyd's will just be more careful when directing
its business toward United States investors. 8 0 Such a result
would only foster the policy objectives of the federal securities
laws. l81
In both Richards II and Richards III, Judge Goodwin ex-
pressed his view that the court should be careful to avoid insult-
ing foreign courts and legislatures. In Richards II he stated
that the court should enforce the choice clauses out of respect
for the integrity and competence of foreign tribunals. 8 2 In
Richards III he argued that "[t]o require that 'American stan-
dards of fairness' must ... govern the controversy demeans the
standards of justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily
177 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1433.
178 See In re Lloyd's American Trust Fund Litigation, 954 F. Supp. 656, 661
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that Lloyd's has been operating for more than 300 years
and that in 1995 more than 15,000 Names from over 50 countries were actively
underwriting at Lloyd's); Appellees' Answering Brief at 6-7 n. 6 (citing Roby, 796
F. Supp. at 104); Appellees' Answering Brief at 11 (stating that Lloyd's Names
reside in more than 80 countries).
179 Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1429.
180 See id. But see Appellees' Answering Brief at 10 (stating that Lloyd's does
not share in the profits or losses made by the syndicates).
181 See Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-
87(1963) (noting, as purposes of the federal securities laws, to implement a policy
of full disclosure of relevant information, to replace the doctrine of caveat emptor,
and to play a critical role in sustaining honest and efficient markets); Allen 1, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12300, at *68 (stating that "the securities laws are aimed at pro-
spectively protecting American investors from injury by demanding 'full and fair
disclosure' from issuers'" (quoting Roby, 996 F.2d at 1364)). See also Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (stating that the federal securities laws should be
construed broadly to effectuate their purposes).
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exalts the primacy of United States law over the laws of other
countries." This argument is slightly misguided. The majority
in Richards H and the dissent in Richards III simply contended
that the courts of England were not equipped with the "firm
shields and finely honed swords provided by American securi-
ties law"18 3 and as a result, English courts could not adequately
protect the Plaintiffs.18 4 This is neither an attack upon the in-
tegrity or competence of foreign tribunals nor does it "demean
the standards of justice" in England. It simply acknowledges
that U.S. securities law is more protective of investors than
English law.
In Richards II, the majority and the dissent agreed that the
anti-waiver provisions of the U.S. securities laws cannot act as
a bar to the RICO claims.18 5 They differed, however, on how to
handle these claims. The majority found insufficient evidence
in the record to evaluate the English remedies available for the
conduct underlying the RICO claim, while the dissent felt the
record was sufficient to determine that the English remedies
were adequate and, thus, the clauses were reasonable. 8 6 Inter-
estingly, the majority was comfortable enough about the infor-
mation in the record to conclude that English law does not
provide adequate remedies for the alleged securities law viola-
tions.18 7 Because the alleged securities law violations provide
the basis for the Plaintiffs' RICO claims, it would seem the rec-
ord contained sufficient evidence to evaluate the reasonableness
of the choice clauses as they affect the RICO claims. The major-
ity in Richards III did not reach a different conclusion and the
dissent did not address this issue.' 88
V. RECENT RELEVANT DECISIONS
A recent case from the Southern District of New York lends
some support to the proposal discussed in the following section
and to the dissent in Richards III. Stamm v. Corporation of
Lloyd's'8 9 was decided after Richards II but before Richards III.
183 Richards H, 107 F.3d at 1430.
184 See id. See also supra part III.C.1.
185 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1436.
186 See id.
187 See id. See also supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
188 Richards III, at *20-21.
189 No. 96 CIV. 5158 (SAS), 1997 WL 438773 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1997).
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In Stamm, the plaintiffs were investors in the Lloyd's system;
their contracts, like the contracts in Richards I, contained the
choice clauses. After the plaintiffs filed their action in state
court based on common law fraud and alleged violations of the
New York General Business Law, the defendant, Corporation of
Lloyd's, removed the action to federal district court. 190 The
plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court because
they did not want to allege violations of the federal securities
laws. 191 The plaintiffs knew that if they sought the protection of
the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws to pre-
clude enforcement of the choice clauses, the Southern District
would be bound by the Second Circuit's decision in Roby. 192 As a
result, the court would dismiss the plaintiffs claim based on the
Roby court's reasoning that the choice clauses do not violate the
public policy of the United States because English law provides
adequate remedies for American investors. 193
The Southern District, however, acknowledged the SEC's
recently expressed position as amicus in Richard II that the
choice clauses violate the anti-waiver provisions of the federal
securities laws. 194 The Stamm court noted that the Roby court
relied, in part, on the fact that the Commission had been silent
on the issue. 195 As a result, the court questioned "whether Roby
continues to squarely preclude the instant plaintiffs from argu-
ing that the... [choice] clauses in the... [Lloyd's contracts] are
unreasonable because they violate United States public policy
by depriving American investors of adequate remedies." 196 The
Southern District then granted the defendants' motion to dis-
miss and granted plaintiffs leave to amend in accordance with
its opinion. 197 The plaintiffs responded to the court's invitation
190 See id. at *1.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See id. See also supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
194 See Stamm, 1997 WL 438773, at *3.
195 See id. at *2-3. See also supra note 49.
196 Id. at *1.
197 See id. at *1-2. In the plaintiffs' initial complaint, they alleged that the
forum selection and choice of law clauses should not be enforced because the
clauses (1) were induced by fraud, and (2) are unconscionable. The plaintiffs
claimed two bases in support of its argument that the choice clauses were induced
by fraud: (a) Lloyd's never informed them about English law, and (b) the plaintiffs
would never have signed the contracts to become Names had they been fully aware
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by filing an amended complaint alleging claims under state law
and federal securities law. 198
The Southern District went on to state that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Richards II is "highly persuasive."199 The
court suggests that Roby may be "unwise or outdated," and
"may well ... [have been] wrongly decided." 200 The court cites,
approvingly, the Commission's amicus curiae brief from Rich-
ards 11.201 The Southern District then indicates that "the cogent
reasoning of the Richards II decision, combined with the SEC's
forcefully-advocated position and Hall's exhaustive scholarship,
combine to form a convincing attack on the citadel of Roby by
undermining the policy bases and analysis of Supreme Court
precedent on which that decision rests."20 2 However, the court
reaches two conclusions: (1) that it is bound by the precedent of
the circuit in which it sits and, therefore, must follow Roby;20 3
of their potential liability. In support of their claim that the choice clauses are
unconscionable, the plaintiffs urged that it would have been too costly for them to
withdraw from the Lloyd's system. The court rejected these arguments. See
Stamm v. Barclays Bank of New York, 960 F.Supp. 724, 730-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
First, the court noted that the legal relationship between the plaintiffs and Lloyd's
was not a fiduciary one, but rather a contractual relationship between business-
men. Consequently, Lloyd's was under no obligation to inform the plaintiffs about
the differences between American and English law and, thus, the potential impact
of the choice clauses. Secondly, the court reasoned, while the plaintiffs may not
have signed the agreements had they known of the potential liability, this does not
support a claim that Lloyd's incorporated the choice clauses as a result of fraud.
See id. at 732 (citing Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 403-404, 87 S. Ct. 1801,
1805-06 (1967)).
Addressing the plaintiffs' claim of unconscionability, the court stated that
there was no "gross inequality in bargaining power between plaintiffs and defend-
ants," such that the plaintiffs had no choice but to sign the agreement. As for the
hardship to be borne by the plaintiffs via costs of withdrawing from Lloyd's, the
court stated that "these allegations could not overcome the reasonable assumption
that plaintiffs signed the New Undertaking because they believed their continued
participation in the Lloyd's underwriting business would be profitable. Contracts
that result from unwise business decisions are not, without more, unconscionable."
Id. at 732-33.
19 See Stamm, 1997 WL 438773, at *2.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 See id. at *3-4. In its earlier opinion granting the plaintiffs leave to amend,
the district court noted that the Commission's amicus brief points out the deficien-
cies in English securities law, and quoted Judge Noonan's summary of some of the
major deficiencies. See Stamm, 960 F. Supp. at 733.
202 Stamm, 1997 WL 438773, at *3.
203 See Grace v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 1997 WL 607543 (S.D.N.Y.) (Unrep.Op.) (not-
ing the Ninth Circuit's holding in Richard's II, but declining to elaborate since that
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and (2) even if there was a way around Roby, which it indicates
there may be, 20 4 it is unable to resolve the issue in this case
because the plaintiffs federal securities law claims are time-
barred. 205
The Stamm decision is noteworthy in several respects.
First, it comes from the Southern District of New York, perhaps
the district most familiar with complex cases involving the fed-
eral securities laws. Second, it severely undermines the credi-
bility of Roby, a case decided by the circuit in which the Stamm
court sits. Third, it highlights the validity of the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Richards II, and the dissenting opinion in Rich-
ards 111.206 Finally, it acknowledges that the Commission has
taken an affirmative position on this issue, and that no longer
can the Commission's inaction be used by Lloyd's to defeat
plaintiffs' claims. Each of these factors suggests the potential
for a circuit conflict when the next court of appeals addresses
this issue. That court may decide to adopt the reasoning of the
majority in Richards II, the dissent in Richards III, and Stamm
to conclude that more deference should be given to the anti-
waiver provisions, which Congress deliberately wrote into the
federal securities laws for the protection of American
investors. 207
In another recent case decided between Richards II and
Richards III, the Ninth Circuit followed its reasoning in Rich-
ards I. In Govett American Endeavor Fund Ltd. v. Trueger,208
decision is the subject of a rehearing en banc and, in any event, S.D.N.Y. is bound
by Roby).
204 See Stamm, 1997 WL438773 at *3. The Southern District suggests that
because the Roby court relied, in part, on the SEC's inaction, Roby may no longer
be "iron-clad precedent" in light of the SEC's recent expression of its position on
the issue of the choice clauses in the Lloyd's contracts with American investors.
See id. See also supra note 49.
205 See Stamm 1997 WL 438773, at *3.
206 See Mayeux's A/C & Heating, Inc. v. The Famous Construction Corp., 1997
WL 567955 (E.D.La. 1997) (Unrep.Op.) (invalidating choice clauses in contract be-
tween contractor and subcontractor based, in part, on Richards II court's reason-
ing that where a statute addresses the validity of choice clauses, courts should
defer to that legislative policy determination and not weigh the reasonableness of
the choice clauses). Interestingly, Mayeux's was decided after the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Haynsworth II and the Ninth Circuit's decision to rehear Richards IIen
banc.
207 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1433.
208 112 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1997).
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the plaintiff, American Endeavor, was an investment fund or-
ganized under the laws of Jersey, Channel Islands. Arthur
Trueger, an American citizen, was one of American Endeavor's
directors. 20 9 When American Endeavor was formed several
agreements were executed: (1) American Endeavor entered into
an agreement with Berkeley Govett International Limited
(hereinafter "BGIL"), a Channel Islands company that is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Govett & Co. Ltd. (hereinafter
"Govett"), also a Channel Islands company, for BGIL to manage
the American Endeavors fund's assets; (2) Berkeley Interna-
tional Capital Corp. (hereinafter "Berkeley"), a California com-
pany, entered into an agreement to provide investment advice
to BGIL; (3) Govett entered into an agreement with American
Endeavor to ensure that BGIL and Berkeley discharged all of
their obligations. 210 All three agreements contained forum se-
lection and choice of law clauses favoring Jersey, Channel
Islands.211
American Endeavor filed suit in federal district court in
California. 21 2 American Endeavor, claiming violations of RICO,
alleged that Trueger orchestrated a scheme whereby American
Endeavor would invest in American companies that would pay
undisclosed kickbacks to Trueger, Berkeley, and BGIL, and
that Trueger, Berkeley, and BGIL misappropriated American
Endeavor's assets for their own personal gain. 21 3 The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.214 The court reasoned that the choice
clauses in the above agreements called for Jersey law; Jersey
law does not recognize RICO (or have a statute like RICO);
therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 215 The
court relied, in part, on the Second Circuit's approval of public
policy in favor of forum selection and arbitration clauses, as ex-
pressed in Roby. 216
209 See id. at 1018-19.
210 See id. at 1019.
211 See id. at 1019-20.
212 See id. at 1021.
213 See Govett, 112 F.3d at 1020.
214 See id. at 1021.
215 See id.
216 See id. (citing Roby, 996 F.2d 1353).
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded rely-
ing, in part, on its decision in Richards 11.217 The court noted
that:
RICO represents a fundamental choice by Congress to employ the
heavy artillery of federal law against a variety of organized crimi-
nal endeavors involving security fraud, wire fraud, and bribery.
To permit this fundamental choice of public policy to be frustrated
by private choice would be to exalt autonomy in contract over the
laws of the United States; to do so would be contrary to the uni-
versal consensus on the appropriate limits to autonomy.
2 18
Acknowledging that part of the plaintiffs' RICO claims were
based on alleged violations of the federal securities laws, the
court stated that the anti-waiver provisions of those laws must
be observed. 21 9 As such, the court noted that the district court's
reliance on Roby and Bonny is unfounded. 220 Thus, the court
held that the RICO claim was permissible "as it incorporates a
pattern of violations of the Securities Acts."'22 '
Not surprisingly, Judge Goodwin dissented again in Govett,
and would have affirmed the district court's finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.222 Judge Goodwin first cited
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, and its mandate
that the law chosen by the parties shall govern unless that
would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state having an
interest materially greater than that of the chosen state.223 He
then suggested that Jersey's interest in providing a remedy for
its citizens is just as strong as the United States' interest in
preventing fraudulent activity by its citizens. 224 As a result,
217 See id. at 1022.
218 Govett, 112 F.3d at 1021-22 (citing Hessel E. Yntenma, 'Autonomy' in
Choice of Law, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 341, 353 (1952)).
219 See id. at 1021-22.
220 See id. at 1022.
221 Id. In discussing the defendants' argument that the RICO claim should be
dismissed because of the choice of law clause, the Ninth Circuit states that "[a]
contract specifying the law of a foreign jurisdiction as the law controlling contrac-
tual duties cannot be used as a defense to claims of torts committed in violation of
federal criminal statutes." Id. at 1021.
222 See id. at 1022.
223 See Govett, 112 F.3d at 1023.
224 See id. at 1023-24.
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Judge Goodwin concluded the law chosen by the parties should
be left undisturbed.225
Although the Ninth Circuit in Govett appeared to rely on its
decision in Richards II, which is no longer controlling law, its
analysis of the RICO claim was quite different in each case. In
Govett, the court suggested that the RICO claim was permissi-
ble partly because it was premised upon alleged violations of
the securities acts. Since the anti-waiver provisions prohibit
waiver of rights under the securities acts, a claim based upon
conduct constituting violations of these acts should not be
"waivable" via a choice of law clause.226 However, in Richards
II, the court stated that the anti-waiver provisions of the securi-
ties laws do not prohibit waiver of rights under RICO, even
where the RICO claim is premised upon alleged violations of the
securities laws.227 There, the court remanded the RICO claim to
examine the remedies available in England for the conduct
upon which the RICO claim was based.228 In Richards III, the
court simply stated that the loss of RICO claims would not pre-
vent the court from granting a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.229
The court in Govett could have found that because Jersey
does not have a statute comparable to RICO, Jersey's remedies
are not adequate to effectuate the purposes of RICO. Conse-
quently, the court could have upheld the RICO claim by finding
that the choice of law clause contravened a strong public policy
of the forum in which suit was brought, and not because the
RICO claim was premised upon alleged violations of the securi-
ties laws. 230 Separate remedies sought by the plaintiffs under
the securities laws, rather than RICO, could have been pre-
served by the anti-waiver provisions. Such a finding would
225 See id. at 1023.
226 Interestingly, the reform Act of 1995 amended RICO to eliminate securities
law violations as a predicate act under RICO. See Richard M. Phillips and Gilbert
C. Miller, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995: Rebalancing Risks and Re-
wards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BusiNESS LAWYER
1009, 1061 n. 314 citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
227 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1430.
228 See id. See also supra note 152.
229 Richards III, at *20-21.
230 See supra note 226.
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have been more consistent with the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Richards I.
Although in Govett the Ninth Circuit applied the anti-
waiver provisions to invalidate choice clauses, as it did in Rich-
ards II, the impact of Govett is not likely to be as significant as
Stamm, which did not follow Richards I. This is so for two rea-
sons. First, in Stamm the Southern District of New York ex-
pressed severe misgivings about the Second Circuit's stance on
the enforceability of the choice clauses in the Lloyd's contracts.
Second, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit's position is some-
what unclear regarding the anti-waiver provisions' applicability
to RICO claims premised upon alleged violations of the securi-
ties laws. Nevertheless, in the wake of Stamm and Govett,
other courts may find it appropriate to give more deference to
the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws.
In Haynsworth 11,231 the Fifth Circuit joined the majority in
upholding choice clauses in Names' contracts with Lloyd's.
There, the Fifth Circuit consolidated two cases on appeal from
the Southern District of Texas. Both cases involved claims
brought by American Names against Lloyd's and/or its affiliated
entities premised, in part, on alleged violations of the federal
securities laws.232 In each case, the defendant moved to dismiss
based on the choice clauses, among other things.233 In Hayn-
sworth 1, the district court granted the motion, finding that the
parties were bound by the choice clauses. 234 In Leslie, the dis-
trict court denied the motion, finding that the choice clauses
were unenforceable because they were procured through
fraud.235
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Haynsworth I and re-
versed Leslie.236 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' claim
that the choice clauses were procured through fraud.237 The
court noted the difference between avoiding the choice clauses
231 Haynsworth 11, 121 F.3d at 958.




236 See Haynsworth 11, 121 F.3d at 970. But see, Lloyd's Scores Victory over
U.S. Names in Fraud Battle, The Lawyer, Sept. 9, 1997 (stating that the Hayn-
sworth and Leslie Names are likely to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court).
237 See Haynsworth II, 121 F.3d at 963-65.
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when the underlying claim was based on alleged fraud and al-
leging that inclusion of the specific clauses in the contracts was
a product of fraud.238 Although the former may support the
plaintiffs' underlying claim, only the latter provides an ade-
quate basis for avoiding the choice clauses.239 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that they were fraudulently induced to
sign the General Undertaking, which included the choice
clauses, because Lloyd's never mentioned the addition of the
choice clauses when these contracts were executed. 240 The court
found two bases to attack this argument: (1) this argument con-
cerns the general undertaking as a whole, not the specific inclu-
sion of the choice clauses; and (2) the plaintiffs, as sophisticated
parties, had the responsibility to read the contract before sign-
ing it.241
The Fifth Circuit then discussed the "reasonableness" of
the choice clauses in light of the public policy embodied in the
anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. 242 Starting
with the presumption of enforceability of choice clauses, estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Bremen and Scherk, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "we must tread cautiously before expanding
the operation of U.S. securities law in the international arena.
The regulatory regime Congress has constructed is 'designed to
protect American investors and markets,' not to stamp out 'any
fraud that somehow touches the United States."'243 The court
then concluded that "[tIo insist on the application of American
securities law where the laws of the parties' agreed upon forum
meet this concern would be the very height of the parochialism
that Bremen condemned."244 The court did not, however, fully
analyze how English law "meet[s] this concern" for protecting
American investors. Although it acknowledged that the federal
securities laws "may be the broadest, most comprehensive of
all," the Fifth Circuit held that this alone cannot render inferior
238 See id. at 963 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n.14).
239 See id. at 963.
240 See id. at 964.
241 See Haynsworth, 121 F.3d at 964-65.
242 See id. at 965-66.
243 Id. at 966-67 (quoting Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications, Inc., 117
F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997)).
244 Id. at 967.
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the laws of other countries. 245 The court wrote merely three
sentences before it concluded that the English remedies were
adequate to protect the policies behind the federal securities
laws.
2 4 6
The most recent case, presently pending before the Elev-
enth Circuit, involves the same choice clauses as those in Rich-
ards 1.247 Lipcon involves another group of Names who sued
Lloyd's for violations of the federal securities laws arising out of
their investments in the Lloyd's system. The district court dis-
missed the action based on the choice clauses. Following the
Bremen Court's reasoning, the court held that the clauses are
presumptively valid, and that this presumption could be over-
come by a showing that the clauses are unreasonable under the
circumstances. First, the court found that the clauses were not
procured through fraud. Second, relying on other courts of ap-
peals, the court found that enforcing the choice clauses would
not deny the plaintiffs a remedy, be fundamentally unfair, or
contravene public policy. As a result, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs have appealed the district
court's decision to the Eleventh Circuit.
In anticipation of the Eleventh Circuit's consideration of
the Lipcon appeal, the Commission filed an amicus curiae brief
with the court.248 In its brief, the Commission states four major
bases for reversing the district court: (1) the choice clauses are
void because their effect is to preclude relief under the federal
securities laws, in violation of the anti-waiver provisions; (2) the
district court relied on the wrong case law; (3) even absent the
anti-waiver provisions, enforcing the choice clauses would con-
travene public policy; and (4) English law does not provide
245 Id. at 969.
246 See Haynsworth II, 121 F.3d at 969-70. The court found fault in the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Richards I that in Scherk the Supreme Court focused on the
forum selection clause, not a choice of law clause and, thus, it is distinguishable.
The court noted that even without a choice of law clause, enforcing a foreign forum
selection clause would often result in the displacement of American law for that of
the chosen forum. See id. at 967. As a result, even if Scherk were factually distin-
guishable, such a distinction is inconsequential to the Court's reasoning. See id.
247 Irmgard Lipcon, et al. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, et al.,
248 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, Irm-
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rights and remedies equivalent to those provided by American
law.
First, the Commission argues that the fact that the plain-
tiffs agreed to the choice clauses is irrelevant because "the very
objective of the antiwaiver provisions is to invalidate such
agreements." 249 The forum selection clause leads to the applica-
tion of English choice of law rules. Those rules lead to the appli-
cation of English law where the parties have chosen for that law
to apply. Thus, the choice clauses together lead to the applica-
tion of English law. The anti-waiver provisions prohibit this re-
sult. Therefore, the choice clauses are void based on the clear
language of the American statutes.
Next, the Commission addresses the case law relied upon
by the district court. It argues that courts have mistakenly
read Bremen to require them to determine whether the choice
clauses would contravene a public policy of the forum. As a re-
sult, courts have analyzed the antiwaiver provisions in a way
that enables courts to treat these provisions as mere expres-
sions of public policy. The Commission notes, however, that the
antiwaiver provisions represent an "express and unequivocal di-
rective that the rights and obligations under the securities laws
cannot be waived." As such, courts are not free to "substitute
their own public policy determinations" for those already made
by Congress.250
The Commission then addressed Scherk and Roby. Reiter-
ating the argument it made as amicus in Richards H, the Com-
mission noted that Scherk did not involve a case where the
foreign forum sought to apply its own law; rather, there, the
contract had a choice of law provision calling for application of
Illinois law. Thus, the district court is not bound by Scherk.
Further, Roby and its progeny, rather than determining
whether American law would be available, focused on whether
English law would be adequate to protect the plaintiffs. As
noted earlier by the Commission, this reasoning is misguided
because Congress' s clear directive is that the clauses should be
void if they would displace American securities law.251
249 Id. p.11.
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The Commission then states its position that, even absent
the antiwaiver provisions, enforcement of the choice clauses
would contravene public policy. This argument is based on the
premise underlying cases such as Mitsubishi Motors and Vimar,
that it is against public policy to prospectively waive statutory
rights. The Commission asserts that the Supreme Court cases
relied upon by the district court involved forum selection and
not choice of law clauses. The courts all held as they did with
the assumption that American statutory remedies would be
available to the plaintiffs. It is precisely because of this as-
sumption that the reasoning of those cases is not binding in this
context. 252 The Commission concluded by reiterating its argu-
ment contained in its amicus curiae brief submitted to the
Ninth Circuit in Richards II, that English law is not as protec-
tive of the plaintiffs as American law. 253
The Eleventh Circuit heard oral arguments May 21, 1998,
but, to date, no decision has been rendered. 254
VI. A PROPOSED HOLDING FOR FUTURE CASES
The foregoing discussion illustrates the difficulty courts
have had dealing with the choice clauses in the Lloyd's con-
tracts.255 The next court confronted with this issue should hold
as follows: (1) the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act ap-
plies to all cases in which a security is acquired25 6 in the United
States; (2) the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Exchange
Act applies to all cases in which a security is offered, purchased,
or sold in the United States; 257 and (3) neither anti-waiver pro-
vision can be avoided by a choice of law clause, or by a forum
selection clause where the chosen forum would not apply United
States securities law. The difference in the treatment of the two
252 Id. pp.18-19.
253 Id. p.22, citing Section 42 of the Financial Services Act of 1986.
254 The publication date of this article was November 15, 1998.
255 See supra note 10.
256 Since the word "acquired" is not expressly defined in the Securities Act, it
should be given its ordinary meaning of securing beneficial ownership. The Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language 18 (1987).
257 See supra note 12-14.
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anti-waiver provisions is due to the broader language contained
in the Securities Exchange Act's anti-waiver provision. 258
This holding would be consistent with the language of the
anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws by which
U.S. courts are bound, assuming the jurisdictional elements for
a claim based on the securities laws are met.259 The require-
ment that a security be offered, acquired, or sold in the United
States would avoid at least some potential criticism that the
American approach to international transactions is one of "pa-
rochialism." 260 In most cases, if this requirement is satisfied,
courts can feel justified that, by enforcing the anti-waiver provi-
sions, they will be protecting persons whom the federal securi-
ties laws were designed to protect. 261
Also, the proposed holding would support Congress's policy
determination that the protection the federal securities laws
provide American investors outweighs the benefits of affording
investors complete contractual autonomy to waive substantive
statutory rights. 262 Congress enacted the anti-waiver provisions
258 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc (1994). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying
text. The difference in the language between the two anti-waiver provisions re-
lates to the purposes behind the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.
The Securities Act focuses on protecting investors in purchasing securities offered
by issuers; as a result, that Act's anti-waiver provision covers any person "acquir-
ing" any security. See supra note 3. The Securities Exchange Act, however, was
intended to have more broad application, covering all secondary market transac-
tions and all persons involved directly or indirectly in such transactions; thus, that
Act's anti-waiver provision prohibits any person from waiving compliance with the
Securities Exchange Act. See supra note 4.
259 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n, 78cc (1994). See also supra notes 32-34 and accompa-
nying text.
260 See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. See also Baker, 105 F.3d at 1105 n.5 (de-
fendant, counsel for Lloyd's, accusing district court of engaging in "parochial solici-
tude" for refusing to allow law firm to avail itself of the forum selection clause in
plaintiffs'/Names' contracts with Lloyd's where dispute was between Names and
law firm, not Lloyd's). See id.
261 See Richards 1I, 107 F.3d at 1433.
262 See Hall, supra note 70, at 86 (acknowledging that academic commentators
have advocated parties' freedom to use choice of law provisions (citing Patrick J.
Borchers, The Internationalization of Contractual Conflicts Law, 28 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 435, 438 (1995); James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses In
International And Interstate Contracts, 65 Ky. L. .J. 1, 3 (1976))). See also Hayn-
sworth I, 933 F. Supp. at 1323 ("Whatever policy may be embodied in a consumer
protection act, public policy strongly supports private law. Party autonomy allows
parties to a contract to specify which laws will govern the contract. Contractually
selecting a forum for future litigation is not an impermissible waiver of rights and
does not violate public policy, especially when the contracting parties are knowl-
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to help investors by precluding them from contracting away the
protection contained in the federal securities laws. 263 Neither
individual investors, nor the courts, should be able to supplant
the policy decision already made by Congress. 264 Further, the
Supreme Court has stated its view that it is irrelevant that par-
ties voluntarily enter into an agreement containing choice
clauses; if a contractual provision waives compliance with a
statutory duty, it is void under Section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act.265
Finally, this proposal would provide predictability for
American investors and for foreign venturers seeking capital in
the U.S., and would obviate the need for courts to compare the
remedies of the respective nations' laws. This proposal may re-
quire analysis of jurisdictions' choice of law rules in order to de-
termine whether a "chosen forum" would apply U.S. securities
law. Choice of law issues in these types of cases are often quite
complex. 266 Nevertheless, the author submits that parties can,
more often than not, better anticipate the outcome of the choice
of law analysis than they could a comparative analysis of the
remedies available, and policies underlying such remedies, in
the respective jurisdictions.
edgeable." (citing Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D.Tex.
1982); Wydel Assoc. v. Thermasol, Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 739, 742 (W.D.Tex.1978);
Accelerated Christian Education, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 925 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.App.-
Dallas 1996); Christian B. Miller, Note, M/V Sky Reefer: Clear Sailing for Foreign
Arbitration Clauses under COGSA, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 935 (1996))).
263 See Hall, supra note 70, at 59. In addition, it has been argued in an analo-
gous context that requiring American plaintiffs to assert their claims against com-
mon carriers only in distant courts would lessen substantially the liability of such
carriers. See Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 773 F. Supp. at 525.
264 See Richards 11, 107 F.3d at 1426. See also supra note 53 and accompany-
ing text.
265 See Shearson lAmerican Express, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (quoted in Appellants'
Opening Brief at 22-23).
266 See, e.g., International Insurance Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of
London, No. 88 C 9838, 1991 WL 349907, at *8-12, 15-16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1991)
(engaging in choice of law analysis between Illinois and English law in dispute
between, among others, insurer and reinsurer). See also Chuidian v. Philippine
National Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 564 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that in federal question
cases, federal common law governs the choice of law determination).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The effect of the anti-waiver provisions of the federal secur-
ities laws addressed in the Richards trilogy, and other similar
cases, 267 is an important issue that and needs to be resolved
consistently.2 68 Its potential impact reaches far beyond the
Lloyd's of London system and into the ever-expanding global
marketplace. Should one of these cases find itself on the steps
of the Supreme Court, or a court in which this issue would be
one of first impression, the proposal discussed in Part VI, above,
would enable the court to reach a conclusion consistent with
Congress's intentions. The proposal also would enable future
participants in the global marketplace to proceed with a reason-
able degree of certainty about the effect of the anti-waiver provi-
sions of the federal securities laws.
267 See Haynsworth II, 121 F.3d at 969-70. Five circuit courts of appeals have
ruled on cases between Names and Lloyd's and/or its affiliated entities. See, e.g.,
Richards II; Bonny, 3 F.3d. 156; Roby, 996 F.2d 1353; Riley, 969 F.2d 953; Hirsch
v. Oakeley Vaughan Underwriting, Ltd., No. 89-2563, (5th Cir. May 31, 1989) (un-
pub. slip op.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990). Similarly, several district courts
have addressed this issue as well. See Richards 1, 1995 U.S. DIST. LEXIs 6888, at
*13-14 (citing Leslie, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15380; Beauzay v. Corporation of
Lloyd's, No. C-94-20859-JW, 1995 Wl 419736 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 1995)).
268 See Appellants' Opening Brief at p. 14-15 (citing Leslie, 1995 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 15380; Feigin v. Lloyd's, No. 95 CV 5541 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Denver Dec. 27,
1995)); Grace, 1997 WL 607543 (S.D.N.Y.) (Unrep. Op.).
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